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BACKGROUND 
In 2002, Petitioner filed in district court his post-conviction petition seeking to conduct 
DNA testing on still extant forensic evidence form the investigation into the murder for which he 
stands convicted and sentenced to death. R. p.5, et seq. Petitioner later moved to amend two 
counts into that petition. R. pp. 106-151. The lower court denied the motion. After Petitioner 
withdrew Count One, the lower court dismissed the matter. R. p. 222. This appeal followed. 
Petitioner's proposed Count Two alleged prosecutorial misconduct including the 
functional equivalent of suborning perjury during the jury trial, to the effect that Petitioner was a 
possible contributor of semen removed from the victim. Proposed Count Three alleged that 
Petitioner conducted none of the offenses and none of their lesser included offenses. It also 
alleged that ifthere was insufficient evidence of actual innocence to wammt his release, there 
was sufficient evidence to warrant the courts reaching his otherwise waived claims. As evidence 
in support of both proposed counts, Petitioner relied on testing conducted at the prosecution's 
request by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI"). The FBI tested swabs used to recover 
evidence, which turned out to be semen, from the victim's mouth and vagina. Initially, the 
prosecution conducted phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing on those swabs. 1 The prosecution 
testing, conducted by the state crime lab, revealed that Petitioner's and the swab's PGM shared 
certain features. However, the FBI lab conducted more refined PGM testing. After being 
advised that the FBI test results "did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the 
1PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids 
containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's particular PGM features. There 
are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As noted in the text, the FBI testing was 
more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state laboratory. 
111 
semen[,]" Petitioner moved to amend Counts Two and Three into his petition. R. pp. 123-27 
(Affidavit In Support of First Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at Exhibit 2 (Greg 
Hampikian, Ph.D., sworn statement)). 
iv 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CHARGING 
PETITIONER WITH THE DUTY TO VERIFY THAT THE PROSECUTION DID 
NOT OBTAIN HIS CONVICTION THROUGH DECEIT VIA AN EXPERT WITNESS 
Respondent answers Petitioner's Opening Brief with three broad arguments. First, 
according to Respondent, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Second, 
Respondent argues, the court below did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to 
amend two claims into his petition because those claims were futile. Third, Respondent contends 
that there is no cognizable state or federal free-standing innocence claim for relief, and that 
Petitioner has failed to make out a gateway innocence claim. Each argument fails. 
I. The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Petitioner's 
Motion To Amend Proposed Count Two's Claims Into The Petition 
On The Ground That Petitioner Could Have Consulted With An 
Expert At Time He Filed The Original Post-Conviction Petition In 
This Action. Denying Legal Recourse To Petitioner For The 
Prosecution's Egregious Misconduct Violated Petitioner's Rights 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); The Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States 
Constitution; Article I, Sections 6 (Cruel And Unusual Punishment 
Prohibited) And 13 (Due Process Guaranteed) Of The Idaho 
Constitution; As Well As Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d 
636, 64 2 (2000 ). 
Respondent claims that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider whether the lower court 
abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to amend two proposed counts into his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Respondent's claim fails for two reasons. Summarily stated, 
Respondent argues that Section 19-2719( 5) sets out certain pleading requirements which must be 
met by every successive post-conviction petition, and that same statute also removes from Idaho 
courts any "power to consider any such claims for relief' which do not meet those requirements. 
Because, Respondent's argument continues, Petitioner did not meet Section 19-2719's pleading 
requirements, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. This argument fails, however, 
for two reasons. First, Petitioner did meet the pleading requirements of Section 19-2719( 5). 
Second, even if Petitioner did not meet the Section 19-2719(5) pleading requirements, the 
legislature's effort to limit this Court's jurisdiction runs afoul of the Idaho Constitution's 
separation of powers requirement. Idaho Const., A1i. 2, §1 & art. 5, §13. 
A. Petitioner's Proposed Amendments Met The Pleading Requirements Of 
Section 19-2719(5). 
Section 19-2719(5) provides, Respondent correctly notes, that an Idaho court may 
consider the merits of a successive post-conviction petition only if the applicant shows that any 
issue raised was not known or could not reasonably have been known within the time for filing 
his original post-conviction petition. Additionally, Respondent also correctly notes, Section 19-
2719(5) provides that a successive petition "shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it 
alleges matters that are cumulative or impeaching[.]" Id. at (5)(b). Contrary to Respondent's 
contention, Petitioner's proposed amendments met each of these pleading requirements. 
l. Petitioner could not reasonably have known that the prosecution 
elicited but failed to correct its forensic expert's false testimony or 
that the FBI's more refined-as compared to the state crime 
lab's-serological testing established his actual innocence. 
Though Petitioner could have discovered well before filing his motion to amend his 
petition the compelling evidence of the prosecuting attorney's flagrant disregard of his ethical 
duty to do justice and Petitioner's constitutional rights, it is wrong that Petitioner could 
reasonably have discovered it. LC. § 19-2719 (3) ("Within forty-two days of the filing of the 
judgment imposing the punishment of death, ... the defendant must file any legal or factual 
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challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known.) & (5) ("If 
the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits 
specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably 
should have been known."). There is a straight-forward reason for this: "Defense attorneys are 
entitled to rely on the presumption that prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties, 
including the duty to disclose exculpatory material." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,648, 8 P.3d 
636, 643, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2000) (citing to Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 284-86 (1999). 
Yet despite this clear statement of state and federal law, Respondent contends that Petitioner 
could and should have retained an expert to review the FBI report "during his first post-
conviction case to ascertain whether the F.B.I. report was susceptible to a different interpretation 
than the opinion provided at trial by the state's experts." Brief at 20. Respondent's contention is 
false for two reasons. First, it flies in the face of the state and federal constitutional due process 
guarantees to Petitioner that the "prosecutors ... fully discharge[] their official duties[.]" Sivak v. 
State, 134 Idaho at 648, 8 P.3d at 643. Second, it suggests that Dr. Hampikian's conclusions 
regarding the FBI report are mere "opinion." 
This Court has never held that post-conviction petitioners must search for prosecutorial 
misconduct or waive any such claims which may otherwise be revealed. None of the cases 
Respondent cites supports his contention that Petitioner waived his prosecutorial misconduct 
claim by failing to seek it out at the time of his initial post-conviction petition. Though it is true 
that in the first case, Sivak, the Court held that, "The State's prosecutorial misconduct in allowing 
Leytham's false testimony at trial to go uncorrected was an issue which reasonably should have 
been known at the time of Sivak's first petition." Brief at 17 ( quoting Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho at 
3 
645.) However, this one sentence comes at the end of the Court's extended discussion 
explaining why the issue should have been known at the time ofSivak's first petition. In that 
discussion, the Court quotes extensively from a deposition of Mr. Leytham revealing that he had 
agreed with the prosecutor to testify against Mr. Sivak in exchange for consideration. Sivak v. 
State, 134 Idaho at 648, 8 P.3d at 643. That deposition's availability to defense counsel at the 
time of the first post-conviction petition served as the basis for the Court's holding that Mr. 
Sivak should reasonably have known about the false trial testimony issue at the time of that first 
petition. Respondent's implicit suggestion is, then, wrong that Sivak stands for the proposition 
that prosecutorial misconduct claims generally must be raised in an individual's first post-
conviction petition. Additionally, Respondent's assertion that Dr. Hampikian's review of the 
FBI Report is analogous to the Leytham deposition in Sivak misses the critical factual distinction: 
Dr. Hampikian's review was not available to Petitioner at the time of his first post-conviction 
petition whereas, in Sivak, the Leytham deposition was available at the time of the initial petition. 
The analogy Respondent seeks to draw works only assuming that Petitioner was legally obliged 
to seek out prosecutorial misconduct at the time he filed his first post-conviction petition. 
However, that directly contradicts this Court's holding in Sivak. Supra. 
So, too, Respondent wrongly suggests that its second cited case, Pizzuto v. State, 134 
Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (Idaho 2000), applies here. While Respondent accurately quotes from 
Pizzuto for the proposition that claims of mere impeachment are not cognizable in a successive 
post-conviction petition, that general principle has no application in the case at bar. Petitioner's 
claim is not that Respondent illegally withheld impeachment evidence, but that it engaged in 
affirmative prosecutorial misconduct by misleading the jury. 
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Finally, Respondent's reliance on its third cited case, McKinney, is misplaced. Brief at 
17. Indeed, Respondent merely quotes from that decision that, "McKinney has waived the 
following issues under LC. § 19-2719 because he either actually knew them, or reasonably should 
have known them, at the time he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief." Brief at 17 
(quoting McKinney, 133 Idaho at 708,992 P.2d at 157). 
The second reason Respondent's contention fails is that Dr. Hampikian's conclusion 
regarding the FBI report is not an opinion. On the contrary, a second sworn statement from Dr. 
Hampikian was filed to protect against just such an unfortunate misunderstanding. In that second 
statement, Dr. Hampikian explains that: 
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my 
June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally accepted by forensic biologists 
and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic tool known to and employed 
by forensic experts in investigating offenses where evidence containing body 
fluids might help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I employed 
using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987, on a par with similar uses 
of blood typing test results. Indeed, the State crime laboratory letter to the FBI 
Laboratory's Forensic Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard 
and typical request when it was made on June 3, l 987. See Appendix I (State of 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of Laboratories' senior 
Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum's letter to FBI) .... Ms. Marcum's 
correspondence shows clearly that the State of Idaho crime laboratory reflected 
the universal acceptance by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM 
subtyping and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I arrived at 
in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by the FBI in its July 13, 
1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear, unambiguous, and used a standard 
reporting language that would be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic 
biologist of the day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ... 
. This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the donor of the 
semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore, there is no indication in the 
FBI report that this finding could be an artifact, or that there was any evidence of a 
mixture in the sample. The standard and universally accepted conclusion in 
1987 (as today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic) does not 
match the questioned semen sample (Ql) taken from the victim's body. Paul 
Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of the semen sample Ql. 
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R. p. 199-202 (emphasis added). Petitioner's proposed amendments met the Section 19-2719 
requirement that he did not know or could not have reasonably known the stated claims. 
2. Neither of the proposed amendments alleged matters that were 
cumulative or impeaching. 
There was no testimony or other evidence at Petitioner's trial to which either proposed 
amendment was cumulative. Neither proposed amendment was impeaching. Evidence of 
prosecutorial misconduct is not impeachment evidence as it is not "designed to discredit a 
witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony." State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 
574, 165 P.3d 288, 292 (Ct.App. 2007). Rather, it is evidence that the prosecution engaged in 
improper behavior in a way that violated the defendant's right to due process. In the case at bar, 
Petitioner alleges, among other things, that the prosecution elicited what it knew or should have 
known was false testimony, and that far from taking any corrective steps, the prosecution 
exaggerated that false testimony in its closing argument. 
3. To the extent that Section 19-2719 penalizes post-conviction 
petitioners for presuming that prosecutors fully discharge their 
constitutional obligations, including not knowingly eliciting false 
testimony and correcting any false testimony which they do elicit and 
which they know or should know is false, it violates Petitioner's state 
and federal constitutional rights to due process. 
Petitioner is entitled as a matter of state and federal constitutionally guaranteed due 
process to the state fully discharging its constitutional obligations, including not knowingly 
eliciting false testimony and correcting any false testimony elicited which it knows is false. U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho at 648, 8 P.3d at 643. 
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To the extent that Idaho Code Section 19-2719 penalizes Petitioner for presuming that the 
prosecuting attorneys and subsequent state representative defending his conviction and death 
sentence fully discharged their constitutional obligations, it violates his state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process. 
B. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) Violates the Idaho Constitution Separation of 
Powers Requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts, 
which the Idaho Constitution provides is "original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in 
equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." By limiting the district 
court's jurisdiction, the statute runs afoul of the Idaho Constitution's mandate that the branches 
of government maintain separation of powers. That mandate is found in two places in the Idaho 
Constitution, article 2, §1, and article 5, §13. 
It is settled that a Section 19-2719 proceeding "is a proceeding entirely new and 
independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 
534,536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Idaho 1986). Article V, Sectionl3's mandate that the legislature 
"provide a proper system of appeals" does not extend to Section 19-2719 proceedings because 
they are not appeals. 
This Court has consistently rejected past legislative efforts to restrict the judiciary's 
jurisdiction. In State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 246, 300 P .2d 491, 494 (Idaho 1956), 
the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to transform previously criminal matters of 
juveniles into civil matters because "[t]he legislature, by denoting as a civil matter what the law 
has previously regarded as a felony, attempt[ ed] to take away jurisdiction vested in the district 
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court by the constitution itself, and ... attempted to render that court powerless to do anything 
about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 
441, 444-45, 243 P.2d 303,304 (Idaho 1952), this Court held that "(t]he original jurisdiction 
conferred upon the district court by the constitution, Art. 5, §20, cannot be diminished by the 
legislature. Const. Art. 5, § 13(.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251, 256-57, 239 P.2d 
266, 269 (Idaho 1951 ), the Court held that "[t]he broad jurisdiction [ created by Article 5, Section 
13] is not subject to diminution by legislative act." The Court held the same thing in Robinson v. 
Robinson, 70 Idaho 122,127,212 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Idaho 1949). Finally, in McKnightv. 
Grant, 13 Idaho 629, 637, 92 P. 989, 990 (Idaho 1907), the Court held that, "We think [Article 5, 
Section13] was ... intended to preserve to the judicial department of the state government the 
right and power to finally determine controversies between parties involving their rights and 
upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or determination made." In 
short, this Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not directly or otherwise 
restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) cannot 
stand as a bar to reaching the merits of Petitioner's post-conviction petition. 
II. THE TWO CLAIMS WHICH THE LOWER COURT DECLINED TO ALLOW 
PETITIONER TO AMEND INTO HIS PETITION WERE VIABLE, NOT 
FUTILE. 
Respondent argues that even if the court below should have reached the merits of 
Petitioner's two proposed amendments, that court's denial of Petitioner's motion should be 
affirmed because the amendments' claims are "futile." Brief at 23. Though Respondent never 
expressly states what it means by "futile," it does note that this Court has held that, under certain 
circumstances, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend. Specifically, "'If the 
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amended pleading does not set out a valid claim, ... of if the opposing party has an available 
defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny 
the motion to file the amended complaint."' Brief at 24 ( quoting Black Canyon Racquetball v. 
First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991)). 
Respondent asserts that the court below did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Petitioner's motion because his motion did not meet the Section 19-2719 limitations period. 
Petitioner has already examined Respondent's limitations period contention and demonstrated 
that it fails. Brief at 24. Thus, this reason fails. 
Second, Respondent contends the claims are futile because "Rhoades has provided no 
evidence that the state was aware of any opinions contrary to the state's expert's opinion." Brief 
at 25. Respondent appears to be arguing that Petitioner's proposed amendments did not allege 
sufficient facts to make out his claim that the prosecution knew or should have known that the 
FBI testing performed at the prosecution's request excluded Petitioner as a contributor of the 
semen removed from the victim. However, this argument ignores and is refuted by Dr. 
Hampikian's affidavit filed with the court below and in which he makes clear that there can be no 
question that prosecution knew the import of the FBI report because "the kind of analysis I 
conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only 
universally accepted by forensic biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic 
tool known to and employed by forensic experts in investigating offenses where evidence 
containing body fluids might help uncover a perpetrators identity." R. p.199. Thus, contrary to 
Respondent's assertion, Petitioner did make out a prima facie case that the prosecution knew that 
its forensic expert's testimony was false. 
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It may be that Respondent means to focus not on what the state's forensic expert knew 
but on what the prosecuting attorneys knew. If this is true, then Respondent would presumably 
be arguing that Petitioner has failed to proffer any evidence that the prosecuting attorneys knew 
that the forensic expert's testimony was false. But if this is Respondent's intended argument, it 
fails as well. Prosecuting attorneys are duty-bound "to learn of any favorable evidence known to 
the others acting on the government's behalf in the case[.]" Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 
(1995). Thus, either the prosecuting attorneys knew or they should have known that their 
forensic expert's testimony was false. Either way, their failure to correct that false and highly 
prejudicial testimony violated Petitioner's federal and state constitutional right to due process. 
Thus, Petitioner's claims do not fail for lack of evidence that the prosecution was unaware that 
their forensic expert's testimony was false. 
III. PETITIONER'S ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS: FREE-STANDING ACTUAL 
INNOCENCE CLAIMS ARE COGNIZABLE AND PETITIONER HAS 
CLEARLY MADE OUT A GATEWAY INNOCENCE CLAIM. 
Respondent argues that there is no cognizable state or federal free-standing actual 
innocence claim for relief. Nor, Respondent contends, does Petitioner meet the actual innocence 
claim standard necessary for a court to reach the merits of a previously procedurally defaulted 
claims. Both arguments fail. 
A. Federal And State Free-Standing Innocence Claims Are Cognizable. 
Respondent correctly notes that the United States Supreme Court has yet to expressly 
hold that a freestanding innocence claim exists. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). 
Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, no state or federal government may kill a defendant who is factually 
IO 
innocent of the offense of conviction, of any aggravating factors necessary to render him eligible 
for death, or of any other facts on which the sentencer relied in imposing the penalty of death. 
Petitioner contends that the Idaho Constitution forbids the State from killing any similarly 
situated prisoner even though this Court has not held that freestanding innocence claims are 
cognizable. Idaho Const. article I, § 13. 
B. Petitioner Has Made Out A Gateway Claim Of Innocence. 
In addition to his free-standing claims of innocence, however, Petitioner claims that he 
has made out a state and federal gateway claim of innocence. Gateway claims are claims of 
innocence supported by evidence sufficient to compel review of a prisoner's otherwise waived 
claims but not to require his release. Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 519-20, 975 P.2d 1181, 1184-
85 (Ct.App. 1999); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Unlike the petitioner in Hays, Idaho 
courts in the case at bar have found Petitioner to have waived a variety of claims that his 
conviction and/or sentence were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights -including, 
according to the court below, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently had occasion to emphasize three features 
of Schlup gateway claims. In resolving gateway actual innocence claims, "[t]he court's function 
is not to make an independent factual determination about what likely occurred, but rather to 
assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 
(2006) (citing to Schlup). Further, "[a] petitioner's burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate 
that more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt --0r, to remove the double negative, that more likely than not any 
reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt." Id at 538. Finally, the question is "how 
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reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record." Id. at 519. 
In the case at bar, the state's evidence was almost exclusively circumstantial. The sole 
exception to this was testimony regarding Petitioner's alleged "I did it" station-house statement. 
In its direct appeal and initial post-conviction appeal review, this Court found that Petitioner 
made his statement in response to the functional equivalent of interrogation. Specifically, he 
responded to Officer Shaw's stating that the victims of Petitioner's might still be alive if 
Petitioner had been arrested earlier. As this Court uoted, 
In this case, based on the record before us, Rhoades did not assert 
his right to remain silent. If he had, Shaw's comment, properly 
found by the trial court to be "the functional equivalent of 
interrogation," would have been improper, and the second 
statement would not have been admissible. 
Id. at 971. As Petitioner has noted in federal court, this was an unnerving forecast of things to 
come. In 1996, Petitioner discovered the facts which, on this Court's view, rendered his station-
house statements inadmissible. In particular, in a l 996 deposition, Officer Shaw produced a 
report he had written in which he states that before stating that victims would still be alive if Mr. 
Rhoades had been arrested earlier, he began questioning Mr. Rhoades about the burglary. Rather 
than engage, however, Mr. Rhoades responded: "' Aw bullshit, I don't want to talk about it.' Get 
these fuckin cuffs off me. "'2 In that deposition, taken nearly ten years after Mr. Rhoades' arrest, 
Shaw testified to the following having occurred during the short patrol car ride from the scene of 
arrest to the station-house: 
Q. Was there a time during your encounter that Mr. Rhoades told 
you he didn't want to talk about any particular subject? 
2The extra quotation mark is in the original report. 
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A. No. When we were in the car and I started to talk to him about 
- I was talking about Lavaunda's Lingerie and only Lavaunda's 
Lingerie in the car because I wanted to start chronologically and 
get this whole thing - you know, I wanted to start there because 
that's where my warrant was. And he said he didn't want to talk 
about it, get these handcuffs off of him because it was cramped in 
that car, and it was cramped. It was cramped for me and I'm 
pretty good sized, too, so I understood that, and so I - when we got 
inside I took the handcuffs off and then we, you know, proceeded 
to talk ... .I assumed he meant right then because of the cramped 
condition in the car and that's - and I'm convinced that is exactly 
what he meant. 
Q. You nonetheless continued to interrogate him at the Wells 
station-
A. I did, yes. 
Q. - about the homicides as well as the Lavaunda's Lingerie 
subject, is that right? 
A. Yes ... 
Shaw Dep. 81-2, Mar. 21, 1996. Shaw was prepared to testify that after arriving at the police 
station, he said to Mr. Rhoades that had he arrested him for burglary, three people would have 
been alive, and that Mr. Rhoades responded, "I did it." 
This Court found that it was "several months" before that second "I did it" was written 
into any report. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho at 73,822 P.2d at 970. And it never made it into a 
report from the only person who would most naturally report it, i.e.- Shaw, the sole interrogating 
officer at the station-house. Id 
And the prosecution emphasized the statements in its closing argument as well; 
Here again, it brings us back to the point that's at issue in this case. What 
happened is not at issue. Even how it happened to a large degree is not at issue. 
The question of who did it is the only issue. When this defendant was arrested in 
Nevada he said, "I did it." He said that as the Idaho officers approached. 
13 
Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 2128 L. 25. After a full page of additional emphasis on Mr. Rhoades' initial "I 
did it," the prosecuting attorney asked, "Did he say, 'Hi Dennis, what brings you to Nevada?' 
No, he says, 'I did it.' He knows why they're there." 
Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 2130 L. 4-6. Then: 
Later in that day as he was being photographed by Detective Shaw ... , Detective 
Shaw laments, he says, "If only I'd arrested you earlier, this victim would be 
alive." To which the defendant responds, "Yeah I did it." What did he mean? 
You know what he meant. He was admitting to having killed Susan 
Michelbacher. Detective Shaw realizing what was occurring, clarifies, says, "The 
lady from Idaho Falls?" The defendant reaffirms, "I did it." 
Id. In addition to the prosecution's emphasizing the "I did it" statements to the jury, jurors do 
not need to be led to place emphasis on confessions. As the Supreme Court has noted, 
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, "the defendant's own confession is 
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against 
him .... The admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most 
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. 
Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may 
justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so." Bruton 
v. United States, 391 U.S., at 139-140 (White, J., dissenting). See also Cruz v. 
New York, 481 U.S., at 195 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton). 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,296 (1991). 
In determining how reasonable jurors would react to the overall record, including the new 
evidence and the evidence which came out at trial, the Court must find that any reasonable juror 
would have reasonable doubt as to Petitioner's guilt. It must, therefore, rule that Petitioner has 
met the actual innocence gateway claim and allow him to develop in the court below claims 
which have earlier been ruled waived. 
Finally, Respondent wrongly asserts that Petitioner "refused to disclose the results of the 
14 
DNA testing that was conducted." Brief at 21. In fact, Petitioner's counsel in the court below 
was in close contact with Bonneville County Prosecuting Attorney Dane Watkins throughout the 
testing process, and Petitioner's counsel shared with Mr. Watkins the results of the ongoing 
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